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ABSTRACT 
Purpose - Regulating microfinance activities has been an important policy concern in improving 
financial inclusion and extending financial services to all. However, introducing a regulatory 
framework of any kind pushes targeted institutions to change. In this case, microfinance regulatory 
framework in Kenya that came to effect in 2008 has created three tiers of microfinance institutions: 
prudentially regulated deposit-taking institutions, credit only and unregulated informal groups. Those 
undertaking deposit-taking business were required by this regulation to transform their operations to 
comply with the requirements. Though many institutions wanted to be allowed to mobilise public 
deposits, only six institutions had managed to obtain a license in four years after the regulation 
became operational. The purpose of this research was to establish the factors affecting this 
microfinance transformation process.  
Design/methodology/approach – The research was carried out by collecting empirical evidence from 
microfinance institutions target by regulation in Kenya to establish these factors contributing to the 
slow phase of transformation.  The possibility that the challenges could be affecting both the regulator 
and institutions being regulated was explored.  
Findings – This study identifies several important factors affecting the transformation process of 
microfinance institutions in Kenya. These include the ability to meet capital requirements, 
restructuring existing ownership and getting new shareholders, ability to raise funds for 
transformation, acquiring suitable information systems, motivation to be regulated, governance issues 
and managerial inertia. These factors explain why certain institutions have moved faster than others in 
the transformation process and why some have opted to remain credit only. 
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Research limitations – The availability of reliable database of microfinance institutions that were a 
target for this study was a challenge affecting sampling and reach. In addition, data collected was 
limited to one point of contact yet some factors could relate to operational process.   
Originality/value – The study broadens research to transformation process of regulated microfinance 








Poverty has continued to be a concern and attracts attention both in the developed world and 
developing world. Unfortunately, in many poor countries the gap between the poor and the 
rich is big and growing (Littlefield, Morduch & Hashemi, 2003). In most instances, the poor 
are denied access to many essential services including financial, education and medical 
services, because they cannot afford them. 
There has been a close association between economic development and financial access. 
Demirguc-Kunt (2006) argues that, although there is no consensus on the nature of the 
association between the two, some scholars are of the view that financial systems are a 
catalyst in alleviating market restrictions and hence influencing savings rates, investment 
decisions, technological innovations and therefore long-run growth rates. Demirguc-Kunt 
(2006) also points out that financial systems help mobilise and pool savings, provide payment 
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services that facilitate the exchange of goods and services, produce and process information 
about investors and investment projects. These facilitate business transactions, both big and 
small.    
Since there is evidence that links the provision of financial services to economic growth as 
well as both increase and distribution of income, the concern has shifted to who has access to 
these services (Littlefield et al., 2003). Of interest is the extent to which the poor have access 
to financial services. Smaller enterprises and poor households face much greater obstacles in 
their ability to access finance all around the world hence isolating them from development 
(Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Honohan & Beck, 2007). Microfinance has been accepted as a viable 
approach to reaching the poor with financial services. It has also been linked with growth of 
micro and small businesses (Littlefield et al., 2003; Omino, 2005). Microfinance has evolved 
over time and is now accepted to be the provision of a full range of financial services to low-
income earners (Littlefield et al., 2003). It employs effective collateral substitutes to deliver 
and recover short-term, working-capital loans to existing (or potential) micro-entrepreneurs 
(Yunus, 2007; Sengupta & Aubuchon, 2008: 9). 
Integrating microfinance into the national financial system has gained a great deal of 
momentum and is seen as a way of increasing financial access for all and bringing the poor 
into the centre of development (CGAP, 2005a; Coetzee, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; 
Honohan & Beck, 2007). Integrating microfinance into a financial system involves more than 
just recognising that it exists. It requires instituting the necessary reforms in the sector to 
create an enabling environment. Such reforms include regulation and supervision of the 
activities of microfinance institutions (Christen, Lyman & Rosenberg, 2003). Institutions 
opting to be regulated are, in most cases, required to transform institutionally to comply with 
set requirements. Sometimes this transformation may involve change of legal status 
ownership, organizational structures and systems, and probably their delivery systems. This 
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change creates challenges for transforming institutions and some institutions may fail to 
transform.  
The push for regulation in Kenya has come from two fronts; on the one hand by microfinance 
institutions have been lobbying for the regulation to gain access to local deposits for on-
lending (Rosengard, Rai, Dondo & Oketch, 2001; Ndambu, 2011) while  government has 
been concerned about the need to protect the poor against losses that could be occasioned by 
unscrupulous operators. The CBK report for 2009 indicates that 33 microfinance institutions 
had sought for name approval as the first step into becoming  becoming a deposit-taking 
microfinance (DTM) but only two had at least acquired a provisional license as at December, 
20 months  after the regulations became effective (CBK, 2009). By December 2011, only six 
institutions had received DTM license, three of them have transformed and the other three 
were newly formed.  
This research, therefore, aims to investigate factors affecting the transformation process of 
microfinance institutions in compliance with the regulatory framework in Kenya. It seeks to 
explain the motivation for regulation and establish factors affecting the transformation 
process. Establishing these factors would help the policy makers and practitioners to improve 
the implementation process. 
2 THEORY AND LITERATURE 
2.1 Microfinance operations 
The origin and evolution in microfinance are closely related to developments in micro and 
small enterprises (MSEs) and implementation of poverty alleviation strategies. The typical 
microfinance clients are low-income persons who do not have access to formal financial 
institutions. These are basically small-scale entrepreneurs and farmers, low-salary earners, 
and all other categories that have low and irregular incomes. These could be found in urban 
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low-income residential areas and rural areas. They are often faced with limited access to 
financial services and other related problems like poor sanitation, poor nutrition, lack of 
education and insecurity (Holtz & Klose, 2000).   
Diverse delivery methodologies have been employed all over the world and have evolved 
over time. These methodologies have revolved around addressing the challenges of the poor 
people who cannot afford to provide collateral or are in need of small quantities of financial 
services whose administrative costs outweigh the income (Hermes & Lensink, 2007). 
According to Hermes and Lensink (2007: 1) many MFIs have employed varied degrees of 
joint-liability group lending to reduce these administrative costs. Some of the most common 
methodologies include: group methodology (Grameen model)1, solidarity group model, 
village banking, financial service associations (FSAs) and individual lending (Wendt & 
Eichfeld, 2006; Delfiner, Pailhé & Perón, 2006). 
Microfinance as a business has proved to be profitable and sustainable (Gross & Silva, 2003; 
Wendt & Eichfeld, 2006). In some countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa some 
microfinance institutions have grown big and transformed into deposit-taking businesses 
specially regulated or within the conventional banking laws (Hishigsuren, 2006). In other 
cases commercial banks have expanded their services to serve the poor and small businesses 
through subsidiaries or establishing fully pledged business units. Analysis in the MIX market 
report of June 2009 shows that deposit-taking microfinance institutions performed better 
(Gonzalez & Meyer, 2009) and access to local savings helps such institutions scale up their 
operations (Wright & Kaplan, 2001; Arun & Murinde, 2011). Access to local savings has 
been the main motivation for microfinance institutions to lobby for regulation. 
2.2 Challenges in microfinance delivery  
                                                 
1 Grameen model uses group guarantee mechanism to provide alternate collateral by the poor as experimented 
by Dr Muhamad Yunus in 1976, initially implemented through Grameen bank in Bangladesh and later 
replicated worldwide.  
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Various studies on the impact of microfinance have been carried out in different parts of the 
world, but researchers have differed on their conclusions. Though Professor David Hulme 
(2000) argues that microfinance institutions have achieved less than what is hyped by donors 
and the poor have benefitted less, Professor Jonathan Morduch blames faulty results from 
weak methods of measurement employed (Goldberg, 2005). Evidence from a cross-national 
study on the impact of microfinance in India, Peru, and Zimbabwe by Nathanael Goldberg in 
2005 strongly suggests that access to financial services at the household, enterprise and 
individual levels is associated with improvements of social and economic welfare of low-
income households (Goldberg, 2005; Zaman 2000). He concludes that impacts of 
microfinance services differ from one institution to another, client to client and depend on a 
variety of other reasons than access (Goldberg, 2005: 46). A recent study by Rosenberg 
(2010: 1-8) indicates that there is no clear-cut conclusion on whether microfinance achieves 
its objectives all the time. Therefore, microfinance on its own may not deliver the expected 
results and some intervention is indeed necessary.  
Sustainability of MFIs is essential for growth in outreach, quality and reliability of provision 
of financial services (CGAP, 2004b). Sustainable MFIs are able to increase their capital 
through retained earnings and hence increased capacity to reach more loan customers. 
According to Littlefield and Rosenberg (2004: 1) microfinance works and is sustainable; 
several institutions have proved that financial services for poor people can cover their full 
costs, through adequate interest spreads, relentless focus on efficiency, and aggressive 
enforcement of repayment.  
Many MFIs find themselves unable to scale up their operations due to limited access to funds. 
Some of the reasons preventing them from accessing external funding are related to their 
weak organisational structures (especially not-for-profit), shortage of management skills and 
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lack of profitability (Avgouleas, 2007). They are unable to attract the interest of outside 
investors.   
Another inhibiting factor has been the lack of a flexible regulatory framework. Where legal 
systems are weak, there are uncertainties regarding enforceability of commercial contracts 
and property rights and low-level mechanisms of gathering reliable information (Avgouleas, 
2007: 32-33). As a result there are agency problems and even group monitoring of alternative 
collateral becomes difficult.  
2.3 Microfinance regulation and supervision  
2.3.1 Rationale for regulation 
Historically microfinance was initiated, sponsored and implemented largely by welfare-
based, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose orientation was different and certainly 
not for profit (Lauer, 2008). With growth in outreach and loan portfolio as well as the need to 
mobilize savings, certain risks started to emerge at both the institutional level and macro level 
(Littlefield & Rosenberg, 2004). These risks were credit risk, liquidity and interest risk, 
fiduciary, ownership and governance risk. Credit risk emanated from the process of 
assessment and the form of collateral available from the poor. Liquidity and interest risk 
resulted from the type of funding the MFIs received (Hannig & Katimbo-Mugwanya, 1999). 
In addition, management risk resulted from the fact that most of the senior staff of the MFIs 
lack banking backgrounds, while ownership and governance risk was a result of no real stake 
existing for board members of such institutions and their internal systems were generally 
weak (Hannig & Katimbo-Mugwanya, 1999: 8-10, Staschen, 1999: 9-12).  
There is consensus that regulating microfinance operations is necessary for the growth of the 
sub-sector and stability of the wider financial sector (Hannig & Katimbo-Mugwanya, 1999: 
8-10, Christen et al., 2003: 8, Cull, Demirguc-Kunt & Morduch, 2009; Sarma, 2011). In some 
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countries like Kenya, Uganda and Ghana, institutions offering microfinance have grown to 
such a level that if not regulated, the safety of the national financial system is at risk (CGAP, 
2008; Arun & Murinde, 2011).  The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) (2003c) 
defines regulation as binding rules governing the conduct of legal entities and individuals, 
whether a legislative body (laws) or an executive body (regulations) adopts them. Two forms 
of regulation exist, namely prudential and non-prudential. Institutions that mobilise deposits 
threaten the security of the financial sector and pose a risk to depositors hence require 
prudential regulation (CGAP, 2003c). Institutions that meet the prudential regulation are then 
issued with an operating license to carry out the financial service delivery as per the set rules. 
Regulation enhances sustainability of MFIs in various ways. It requires formal ownership and 
governance structures, that are vital for continued sustainability and transparency, to be 
defined (Mersland, 2008). The management of MFIs are constantly monitored and put under 
pressure through regular reporting and disclosures. Prudential regulations specify 
performance indicators to be adhered to, hence the public builds trust on regulated institutions 
and are willing to save with them (Christen et al., 2003). Thus regulation helps MFIs to 
increase their chances to attract external funding or investors (Avgouleas, 2007). The benefits 
of a well-crafted and implemented regulation regime are great as it usually levels the playing 
ground for financial institutions and receives public acceptance. 
The generally-agreed objectives of prudential regulation include (Christen et al., 2003; 
Hannig & Katimbo-Mugwanya, 1999; Staschen, 1999; Lauer, 2008; Shankar, 2009: 2-3; 
Arun & Murinde, 2011): 
i) Protecting the country’s financial system by preventing the failure of one institution 
from leading to the failure of others; 
ii) Protecting small depositors, who are not well positioned to monitor the institution’s 
financial soundness themselves; 
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iii) Ensuring that there is no unwarranted run on a financial institution; and  
iv) Effectively limiting the danger of opportunistic behaviour.  
There is concern to protect consumers from excessive risk taking behaviours of some players 
in the financial market for selfish gains (Avgouleas, 2007; Arun & Murinde, 2011). On the 
other hand, the main motivation for regulatory change is to encourage formation of new MFIs 
and/or improve performance of existing institutions (Christen et al., 2003). Regulating 
microfinance is believed to have the effect of increasing the volume of financial services 
delivered and the number of clients served through increased safety of deposits and 
confidence in the regulated institutions.  
2.3.2 Regulatory framework 
Regulators have a challenge in determining who, what, how and when to regulate. At initial 
stages regulators can choose to have no regulation, self-regulation, use existing banking 
regulation or set special regulations (Staschen, 1999; Kirkpatrick & Maimbo, 2002; WSBI, 
2008). Where the choice is to use existing banking laws, the framework should be structured 
to provide MFIs with a clear view of attaining institutional development and transformation 
(Gallardo, 2001). In addition, these laws should enable the MFIs to operate sustainably in a 
market-based financial system and be able to offer a wide range of financial services like 
savings, insurance and transfer facilities (Gallardo, 2001; Lauer, 2008). The focus of 
regulation should be on the microfinance activities rather than on the institutions (WSBI, 
2008: 6). 
Regulation of microfinance activities and MFIs may take three main forms: (a) simple 
registration as a legal entity; (b) non-prudential regulations that provide standards of business 
operations and oversight, such as operating and financial reports to be submitted, to protect 
the interests of clients or members; and (c) full prudential supervision (Gallardo et al., 2005). 
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There seem to be a consensus that prudential regulation should be used primarily with respect 
to deposit-taking institutions to protect depositor safety and the soundness of the financial 
sector as a whole (CGAP, 2008; Sinha & Sagar, 2007). Non-prudential regulation, often more 
appropriate for the regulation for credit-only microfinance institutions, tends to be easier to 
enforce and less costly (Chiumya, 2006; Christen et al., 2003). Experiences in Ghana, Benin, 
Tanzania, India, Nepal, Uganda and Zambia show that the approach to microfinance 
regulations are different and have resulted in varied degrees of success (Gallardo, Ouattara, 
Randhawa & Steel, 2005; Sinha & Sagar, 2007: 7; Sinha, 2007:12; Okumu, 2007; Chiumya, 
2006: 226-228). 
The approach to regulation may differ from country to country. Some countries such as 
Bolivia and Peru in Latin America, and Ghana, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia in Africa, have 
opted for a tiered financial and regulatory structure (Gallardo, 2001; Okumu, 2007; Chiumya, 
2006). Avgouleas (2007) emphasised the need to fashion differentiated licensing regimes for 
MFIs depending on their structure and services they offer. in their comparative review of 
microfinance regulatory regimes in Benin, Ghana and Tanzania found that recognising 
different tiers of both regulated and unregulated institutions in a financial structure facilitates 
financial deepening and outreach to otherwise underserved groups in urban and rural areas 
with flexibility in supervision mechanisms (Gallardo, Ouattara, Randhawa & Steel, 2005; 
Steel & Andah, 2004, Christen et al., 2003). Kenya has also adopted a tiered approach. In 
addition, the World Savings Banks Institute (WSBI) (2008) suggests that a good regulatory 
framework should have triple objectives to: (i) support growth in financial access; (ii) 
guarantee a level playing field for all involved; and (iii) protect all consumers (WSBI, 2008: 
7-9). Savita Shankar (2009) suggests that regulators should avoid over regulation that 
hampers innovation and unduly increases transaction costs. 
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2.3.3 Institutional transformation resulting from regulation 
Venkateswaran (2007) defines institutional or organizational transformation as “an act, 
process or an instance of changing organization’s context, principles or business processes 
that radically orients it to a new direction and takes it to a different level of effectiveness” 
(Venkateswaran, 2007). The need for transformation could be triggered by change in 
governing laws, change in business environment or enactment of a new law that alters the 
way the business is conducted. 
Microfinance transformation generally refers to the institutional process whereby an NGO 
microfinance (or other) provider creates or converts into a share-capital company and 
becomes a regulated financial institution to carry out deposit-taking business or just become a 
credit institution (Ledgerwood & White, 2006; Dreihann-Holenia, 2009). Types of 
microfinance transformation represent a continuum. The simplest and most common type of 
microfinance transformation occurs when an existing MFI operation is transferred to the local 
office of an international NGO as a new, locally-formed NGO (Lauer, 2008). On the other 
end is a legal transformation that involves the creation of a commercial company by an NGO, 
to which the NGO contributes its existing portfolio in exchange for shares in the new 
company (CGAP, 2003c).  
3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The target population for this study was formal financial service providers to low-income 
earners operating as microfinance institutions. Therefore the unit of analysis was identified as 
the microfinance institution targeted by the Microfinance Act of 2006. Emphasis in this study 
was put on MFIs since their regulation has been effective for two years up to the time of this 
research. The population of the MFIs whose contacts were available was small and a survey 
method was applied with questionnaires being sent to all the 63 institutions.  
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This is an empirical study largely using primary data (Mouton, 2008: 158) since such data 
was not available from secondary sources. It applied a mixed methods approach that uses 
qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques and analysis procedures. The study 
made use of a standardised questionnaire that was sent to the respondents via email, dropped 
or administered by the researcher. Semi-structured and unstructured interviews were 
organised with representatives from treasury, the chief executive officer (CEO) of AMFI and 
three CEOs of MFIs. 
Data collection was based on variables that were identified in the literature review where the 
dependent variable was the pace of change measured by the progression through the stages of 
transformation to become a deposit-taking microfinance institution. Independent variables are 
ownership and governance, size of MFI and capital structure and the MFI’s readiness for 
change. Ownership and governance were measured by the diversity of ownership prior to 
transformation, board size and structure and organisational form prior to transformation. Size 
of the MFI was measured by the value of assets, loan portfolio and client base. The MFI’s 
readiness to change was measured by size and quality of management, ability to raise funds, 
prior training on transformation and preliminary work done like a feasibility study. 
Use of advanced statistical analysis like ANOVA and regression in this research was limited 
since most of the data was either ordinal or nominal. However, relationships between 
variables were established for categorical (nominal) data through cross-tabulation. To test the 
significance of the relationship between categorical variables used in this research, Pearson 
Chi-square was used. The technique is used because one can compute expected frequencies in 
a two-way table (Statsoft, 2010). 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Status of microfinance regulation 
13 
 
The findings points out that many institutions wanted to be regulated but few seem to be 
making it. Though 33 institutions sought approval of name by December 2009, only 10 
(30%) had made it beyond first step and three were at the final stage. In fact, the process may 
even be harder because the one-year window that was accompanied by some substantial 
waivers elapsed before many of these MFIs moving to the application stage to take 
advantage. Figure 1 below shows the stages at which the MFIs were at time of this survey. 
 
Figure 1: Stage in transformation 
Source: Research data, 2010. 
There is evidence in this research that some big MFIs that exist as shown by asset base, 
number of borrowers and branch network spread throughout the country. 25 per cent of the 
institutions had total assets greater than Kshs 500 million (equivalent to USD 6.5 million) and 
25 per cent had over 10 branches countrywide. Going by these measures of size, some MFIs 
are bigger than some commercial banks supervised by CBK and mobilize huge amounts of 
deposits.  
The data collected revealed that the largest three MFIs (with over 90,000 borrowers) either 
have received the license or are in the final stage. Two of these institutions have received the 
license and the other opted to acquire an existing commercial bank and is waiting to receive 
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the operating license. The trio had engaged consultants or had experience of transformation 
through affiliated institutions elsewhere and therefore they had an advantage to move faster 
in their quest for transformation. In addition, 73 per cent of the respondents had chosen to 
become deposit taking and out of these majority (55%) want to operate nationwide DTM. 
This proportion is as high as 86 per cent among the MFIs category. 
Another key finding was that many institutions (40%) were ownerless, that is, were either 
NGOs or companies limited by guarantee. All these institutions were MFIs and their capital 
was largely donated or had one owner, a holding company or trust. In addition, 50 per cent of 
the institutions had their board elected by shareholders while the other 50 per cent had their 
boards are appointed by the donor or sponsor (40%), CEO (5%) or community (5%).  
4.2 Challenges in microfinance transformation  
In collecting data on challenges facing MFIs in transformation process, an adjusted Likert 
Scale of 1 – 10 was used. During data analyzing additional categories were created 
summarizing these scales to three; low (1 to 3) medium (4 to 7) and high (8 to 10) and 
assigned scales of one to three in that order. The mean score is derived from computing a 
weighted average of low, medium and high. Table 1 shows a ranking of the challenges using 
the mean score for MFIs.  
MFIs seem to face several challenges in trying to transform to regulated institutions. These 
challenges vary in degree of severity among the MFIs and from one challenge to another. The 
main challenges for all institutions transforming to prudential regulation were acquiring 
suitable software, setting branches that meet requirements and raising fund for 
transformation. Using ranking by mean score, the challenge on meeting branch set 
requirements was the most serious challenge closely followed by fund raising for 
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transformation, acquiring suitable software and developing suitable MIS. Board and 
management issues were relatively lesser significant challenges for MFIs. 
Table 1: Descriptive summary for major challenges 
 N 
Scores in percentage Mean 
score 
Std. 
Deviation Low (1) Medium (2) High (3) 
Meeting branch set-up 
requirements 
33 15 85 0 2.85 0.364 
Raising funds for 
transformation 
33 3 24 73 2.7 0.529 
Acquiring suitable software 33 6 27 67 2.61 0.609 
Developing suitable MIS 33 3 64 33 2.3 0.529 
Soliciting for willing 
investors 
33 27 18 55 2.27 0.876 
Organising financial & other 
documents  for application 
33 6 67 27 2.21 0.545 
Restructuring ownership 33 33 18 49 2.15 0.906 
Setting up board structures 
& systems 
33 15 58 27 2.12 0.65 
Lengthy transformation 
process  
33 9 73 18 2.09 0.522 
Raising minimum capital  33 30 40 30 2 0.791 
Registering foreign stake 33 33 37 30 1.97 0.81 
Recruiting management 33 6 91 3 1.97 0.305 
Undertaking feasibility study 33 18 70 12 1.94 0.556 
Meeting capital adequacy 33 18 76 6 1.88 0.485 
Completing "Fit and Proper 
forms" 
33 18 76 6 1.88 0.485 
Preparing business plan 33 33 61 6 1.73 0.574 
Compiling directors profiles 33 33 64 3 1.7 0.529 
Compiling profiles of 
shareholders 
33 36 64 0 1.64 0.489 
Setting management 
structures and systems 
33 49 51 0 1.52 0.508 
Source: Research data, 2010. 
16 
 
4.3 Purpose of transforming to regulated institution 
The new microfinance law (GOK, 2006) requires institutions offering microfinance services 
to make a choice on whether to take deposit or remain credit only. Each option has its own 
set regulations. 
As per the analysis of those that were involved in this research study, a large proportion 
(68%) indicated that they would want to become deposit taking. The main motivation for this 
is to access public deposits to fund their lending activities and growth (Avgouleas, 2007). 64 
per cent of the respondents were already holding deposits for customers. Though one of the 
objectives of being regulated is for MFIs to access equity and deposits for growth 
(Avgouleas, 2007), but this ambition may be beyond the reach of many. The results indicated 
that the majority of the institutions (43% of total respondents and 86% of those that have 
started the process) are still stuck at application stage, they are unable to meet the 
requirements for licensing such as ownership, management structures, software and MIS, 
branch requirements, business plan and feasibility study report and so on. In addition to this 
AMFI CEO, Benjamin Nkungi (2010) stated that legal requirements for capital and 
shareholding are hard to meet especially those institutions that are owned by one or several 
welfare organizations. This explains why most of them are stuck in stage two and are not 
likely to move beyond that stage.   
4.4 Factors affecting microfinance transformation 
In Table 1 in section 4.2, various challenges facing the microfinance regulation and eventual 
transformation have been identified. These challenges formed the basis of seeking to know 
the factors that affect the transformation process by either slowing down the process or 
preventing some MFIs transforming to regulated institutions. Evidence collected had strong 
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score in some of the factors while in others it was not very clear and would require further 
research to confirm or disapprove them. These are discussed below. 
4.4.1 Soliciting for shareholders 
Many MFIs, and more specifically the small MFIs, are unable to attract willing shareholders, 
fundraise for transformation and meet other basic requirements. The research data indicated 
that 72 per cent and 20 per cent of the respondents rated severity of the challenge of soliciting 
for new shareholders as high and medium respectively. This implies that the majority of the 
MFIs find it difficult to get investors into their institutions. Ezra Anyango (2010), 
microfinance expert at the Treasury agrees that it is not easy to solicit for new shareholder 
since this would require performing due diligence. According to Joanna Ledgerwood and 
Victoria White (2006), fundraising for share capital requires an institution to prepare a 
prospectus and conduct due diligence of willing shareholders that could be both expensive 
and time consuming. It also means moving away from traditional financiers to commercial-
like investors. Among other things, these investors are interested at the bottom line to see if 
there is profit (Ledgerwood & White, 2006). This is a tall order for small and non-profitable 
MFIs (Lauer, 2008). 
The search for investors is complicated by the fact that the MFI wants to maintain its mission 
and core values while available commercial investors may not have the same interests 
(Ledgerwood & White, 2006). The process of reaching consensus may take time or at times 
may lead to compromise. Many transformed MFIs have suffered from a mission drift 
(Rosenberg, 2010). The regulator also has to approve the would-be investors. According to 
empirical evidence, 80 per cent of the respondents indicated that providing profiles for 
shareholders presented a moderate challenge. This is complicated by the fact that there might 
not be enough willing local individual or corporate investors. The law limits forms of entities 
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that can own a stake in transformed MFIs. NGOs, community-based organizations and 
church organizations are among the entities that cannot own stakes in transformed MFIs. 
4.4.2 Restructuring ownership 
The issue of restructuring ownership is complicated and has a number of facets. The first 
issue has to do with opening up ownership from one to many; ceding control to a broader 
group of stakeholders (Awan, 2010). About 25 per cent of the institutions interviewed had 
less than five shareholders.  
Secondly, shifting ownership or creating ownership from an ownerless situation where 
donors and founders have no legal monetary stake but have helped create the MFI (Lauer, 
2008) is a challenge. About 40 per cent of the institutions were relying on donated funds from 
different sources. This revelation is in agreement with comments from the CBK Governor 
Professor Njunguna Ndung’u (2010b) that many NGO microfinance institutions are finding it 
hard to convert to a limited company. 
The third aspect is that of foreign ownership. Some MFIs were founded by international 
NGOs and wholly owned by such while the law limits ownership by foreign entities (Lauer, 
2008). The process of ascertaining the suitability of such foreign institutions is lengthy. 88 
per cent of the MFIs had indicated that the severity of challenge on registering foreign stake 
is either high (40%) or medium (48%).  
4.4.3 Software and MIS issues 
Managing deposits is more challenging and sensitive than loans. The public is very sensitive 
on deposits and any misinformation could send a serious signal of panic to the public that 
could cripple the entire financial sector. CBK is very keen on this matter and has set out 
conditions and functionalities of the MIS and application software that should be met before a 
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license could be issued. An inspection of such systems has to precede the issuance of the 
license. There is no waiver on this matter. 
In addition, the cost of acquiring suitable software application with banking functionalities is 
high (Christen et al., 2003). The situation is worsened by requirements for the detailed 
documentation of customers and loan transaction to help achieve the goal of ‘know your 
customer’ as specified in Section 37(1) of the Microfinance regulations 2008. In addition to 
software cost, the hardware cost to support such systems is high. This explains why the 
severity of the challenge to set up MIS and reporting systems and acquisition of suitable 
software was rated as high or medium by 80 per cent and 78 per cent respectively. The 
reporting deadlines of the 22 reports to be sent to CBK as outlined in the regulations could be 
a real challenge (GOK, 2008a). This poses a danger of redirecting MFIs’ resources to just 
producing reports to CBK instead of doing the core business (Nkungi, 2010; Anyango, 2010).   
When the asset base variable was cross-tabulated with the challenge of acquiring software, a 
relationship was established. The p value (0.028) for Pearson Chi-Square is less than the 
significance level of α=0.05. This implies that there is enough evidence to conclude that the 
size of the MFI as measured by asset size is related to the challenge of acquisition of suitable 
software. The software challenge is more severe with larger MFIs. 
4.4.4 Branch set up  
The requirements of a fully-pledged branch for DTM are expensive to establish. An estimate 
given by a treasury expert is USD 50 000 (Anyango, 2010). About 85 percent of respondents 
rated the severity of the challenge of setting up a branch as high or medium. Obviously, the 
cost involved in setting up a branch is a major constraint. This situation is worsened by the 
fact that MFIs are increasingly finding it hard to raise funds from donors. As noted by 
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Shankar (2009), if regulation requirements increase the cost of operation they become a 
constraint.   
Further analysis on correlation between resource base (total assets) and challenge on branch 
set-up does show some relationship. The resulting p value for Spearman’s Correlation is 
0.637 for two-tailed test and is greater than the significance level of α=0.05. This implies that 
the challenge on branch set-up was not related to the asset base of institutions. Thus, the 
challenge was significant for both small and big institutions. In addition, the correlation 
between number of branches currently held and the challenge of setting up new branches is 
not significant. The p value for Spearman’s correlation is 0.285 (2-tailed test) suggesting that 
the challenge for setting up new branches is independent of the existing branch network. New 
branches cannot operate in the same set up as the current office without spending substantial 
amounts of money to refurbish them to comply with the CBK standards.  
4.4.5 Ability to raise funds for transformation  
A lot of resources are required for transformation. Setting up a branch, acquiring 
microfinance software, developing business plan and feasibility study and writing the 
required manuals are expensive and sometimes the process requires use of external 
consultants. According to Phyllis Mbui (2010) and Francis Kihiko (2010), raising funds for 
these activities could be a challenge. About, 60 per cent of the respondents rated the severity 
of this challenge as high and another 20 per cent as medium. The challenge is therefore a 
major hindrance to transformation. There are few donors that are willing to fund 
transformational activities (Ledgerwood & White, 2006). 
The situation may be complicated by the fact that future profits of the transformed MFIs may 
not be forthcoming. Available data indicated that 63 per cent of the respondents were either 
not sure whether the profitability will increase or predicted that it will not increase much. 
21 
 
With this forecast, transforming MFIs may not wish to take up the risk of borrowing from 
commercial sources to meet transformation expenses. 
Cross-tabulation between the size of MFI (given by asset base) and stage in transformation 
shows that bigger institutions were able to move faster in transformation. The results of 
Pearson Correlation indicate a p value of 0.003. Even at significance level of α=0.01 there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude that resource base contributes to the pace of transformation. 
Bigger institutions that have their own resources did not entirely depend on external sources 
to fund all their transformation activities. Though at a slower pace, these larger institutions 
could get started with setting up their own systems. Faulu and KWFT, the two MFIs that 
were able to transform by 2009, received sizeable funding for transformation from both 
donors and commercial sources (Faulu Kenya, 2009).   
4.4.6 Institutional readiness for transformation  
Analysis on readiness to transform indicated that there are issues related to management 
experience in transformation, engaging expert advice on the process or training their teams on 
transformation. About 93 per cent of the institutions did not have management experience in 
transformation and another 78 per cent did not engage services of a consultant to advise them 
on transformation. In addition, about 53 per cent did not have formal training on 
transformation process and challenges. These observations point out that all three the 
institutions that made it had utilized two of the above transformation enhancement activities. 
All three the institutions had engaged consultants to advise them on the transformation 
process.  
The driver of change is the human component in an organization. According to Awan (2010), 
NRSP in Pakistan was able to transform faster because staff were involved, trained, informed 
of everything that was happening and their concerns were addressed. When employees are 
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aware of what is happening and that the transforming institution accommodates their concern, 
they are willing to support the process. When employees are not involved in institutional 
change, there is much resistance due to fear of the unknown and the transformation boat is 
rocked from within (Nkungi, 2010).  
It could be deduced that the slow pace of transformation arises from lack of institutional 
preparedness to change. A test run for this relationship for MFIs showed that there is a strong 
correlation between stage in transformation and training on transformation or consultancy 
support for transformation. In both cases the p value is 0.001 and therefore at significant level 
of α=0.05. There is thus overwhelming evidence that lack of training or technical assistance 
(consultancy) is slowing down the process of transformation. 
4.4.7 Raising minimum capital 
Meeting minimum capital requirement is a big challenge especially for small MFIs. Those 
choosing to operate nationwide DTM are required to have minimum capital of Kshs 60 
million and community- based DTM to have Kshs 20 million (GOK, 2008a; GOK, 2008b). 
Though the overall rating of the challenge of raising minimum capital was 58 per cent, 80 per 
cent of the MFI respondents rated the severity of meeting minimum capital as either medium 
or high.  
4.4.8 Maintaining adequacy 
Evidence from empirical data indicates that about 68 per cent of the respondents noted 
meeting capital adequacy as a challenge. Probably this explains why 32 per cent of the 
institutions have chosen to remain credit only or not yet decided. This is so because the 
conditions for capital adequacy for DTMs are tougher than for commercial banks. As per the 
confession of Philip Ochola (2010), the condition provisions for bad and doubtful debts are 
more stringent for DTMs than for commercial banks. This erodes the value for adjusted 
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assets and eventual reduction of capital adequacy ratio (Anyango, 2010). Most regulators 
consider microloans that normally have no tangible collateral as very risky and hence award a 
higher provision (Delfiner et al., 2006; Christen et al., 2003; Handy, Holden & Prokopenko, 
2002). Though the quality of MFIs’ loan portfolio is much better than that of commercial 
banks, many regulators lack the tools to gauge this (Ramírez, 2004). 
4.4.9 Governance issues  
The results of this research support earlier findings in the literature that quality governance 
could be a factor affecting transformation or challenge for transforming institutions (Lauer, 
2008). The fact that most of the board members (77%) of MFIs are appointed by the 
donor/sponsor, CEO or community is also supported by the rating of transformation 
challenges. The results on governance issues indicate that the severity of the challenge of 
profiling directors was rated by 55 per cent of respondents as both high and medium. 
Similarly the challenge in setting up governance structures and systems as well as preparing 
profiles for directors were rated high and medium by 70 per cent of the respondents. 
Replacing current board members with ones that meet the criteria set by the CBK may not be 
that easy (Lauer, 2008). The situation is worse where some of the board members and the 
CEO were the founders of the MFI. They would be reluctant to effect changes that would 
affect them negatively. This could be a possible reason why many MFIs have adopted a 
‘wait-and–see’ attitude (Ndung’u, 2010a) and are not pushing management to effect changes. 
4.4.10 Management Structures and systems  
The empirical evidence shows this as a medium challenge. Ezra Anyango (2010) and 
Benjamin Nkungi (2010) point out that the challenge with microfinance law is that many 
CEOs of the MFIs do not pass the test of occupying such positions in the transformed and 
regulated institution. Pursuing transformation was viewed like pushing for their retrenchment. 
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Recruiting senior managers was rated by 91 per cent of respondents as a medium challenge 
and another three percent as high. Getting persons that have both banking and MFI 
experience is hard. Many managers working in the microfinance industry lack banking 
expertise. Setting up management structures was also rated as a challenge by 51 per cent of 
the respondents.  
In addition, the regulator is very strict on the recruitment of senior managers for DTM. There 
are minimum requirements for each position that has to be filled and the names must be 
approved beforehand. For example, the CEO of the DTM should have among other things 
five years of banking experience, economics, microfinance or law (CBK, 2008). Treasury and 
operations managers must have banking experience. Going by the experience of the two 
transformed MFIs, there has been a change of guard at the top. The CEOs have been replaced 
together with other changes in senior positions. This has created uncertainty among the 
founders of these MFIs who had become CEOs as it appears going for DTM would mean 
they pave the way for other persons. In a separate occasion, the governor has complained that 
the CEOs of the MFIs are not keen to transform, as they have even adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ 
attitude on their part too (Ndung’u, 2010a).  
4.4.11 Motivation to improve public image  
An emerging factor from the empirical evidence is a strategic move by the MFIs to remain in 
business. Out of the 30 institutions that chose to become DTMs or bank, 25 institutions 
(representing 83%) predict that competition will increase and this could be interpreted to 
mean a threat to their business. Those taking deposit will be in a better position to offer 
variety of services to their customers and stand to retain them as well as attract others. DTMs 
will have a competitive advantage over their counterparts that remain credit only. In this case 
moving to become DTM is a strategic decision for survival. 
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In addition, there is a close relation between institutions that chose to become DTMs and 
those that predicted increase in financial stability. 75 per cent of respondents whose 
institutions (30 cases) chose to become DTMs predicted that financial stability will improve 
either significantly or to a greater extent. Again, it can be interpreted that institutions chose to 
become DTMs to improve their image.  
Financial discipline was another aspect that appears to have an influence on the decision 
taken. 52 per cent of the respondents indicated that their institutions chose DTM because they 
predicted that financial discipline will improve either significantly or to a greater extent. This 
observation could be interpreted to mean that institutions choosing to become DTMs would 
want to be disciplined and be seen to play within the law. Similarly this is another image 
issue.  Thus becoming regulated was a major motivation. 
4.4.12 Application process and documentation  
The transformation process is viewed as lengthy and cumbersome. 75 per cent of the 
respondents felt that the transformation process is lengthy and thus discouraging. Choice of 
names was not a challenge, supported by 70 per cent and this explains why 50 per cent of the 
institutions have had a name reserved for them. Choice of names was only applicable for 
MFIs transforming to deposit taking. 
Respondents indicated that some of the documents that have to be prepared and lodged at 
various stages pose a challenge. Assembling all the documents to accompany the application 
was rated as a medium to high challenge by 78 per cent of the respondents. Feasibility study 
and business plan preparation was seen as a challenge by 73 per cent and 55 per cent of 
respondents respectively. Preparation of these documents are particular a challenge for small 
MFIs that have lean management and lack people with adequate skills. With limited 
resources, they are constrained to outsource the service.  
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The CBK governor (Ndung’u, 2010b) acknowledged regulators’ dilemma in developing 
regulatory framework as there is a trade-off between flexibility and risk control. The 
regulator has “no appetite for risk” (Ndung’u, 2010b). All the above paperwork is geared 
towards gathering as much information as possible to gauge risk per each applicant for 
licensing. This confirms the argument that many regulators do not understand the operations 
of microfinance (Dreihann-Holenia, 2009) and they cover themselves with more controls. 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
5.1  Factors affecting transformation 
This research identified factors that affect the transformation as arising from the process in 
which the institution implement it, challenges they are facing and perception of the future of 
microfinance business. In summary following factors have been identified as to be affecting 
that the pace of the transformation process of MFIs to regulated institutions in Kenya and 
these should be of interest to policy makers.  
a) Ability to raise funds for transformation. Transformation is expensive and requires 
substantial amount of money to acquire software, set up systems, develop business 
plan and feasibility study, set up branches and pay for consultancy services on various 
aspects. 
b) Raising minimum share capital. The regulator sets minimum capital that institutions 
seeking prudential regulation must raise and contribution limit by a single investor. 
Raising this capital internally may take time for small MFIs.  
c) Ability to acquire and implement suitable information systems. Acquiring banking 
software that has capabilities of addressing MFIs information needs is expensive. The 
information requirements for DTM are enormous and the regulator is clear on this 
matter that information systems must be in place before a license is issued. 
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d) Meeting capital adequacy requirements. The conditions of capital adequacy are 
tougher for prudentially regulated MFIs than those of commercial banks for example 
provisions for loans. Some MFIs feared that complying with this provision may have 
adverse repercussions on their performance. 
e) Restructuring ownership. Institutions that were originally NGOs, limited companies 
by guarantee or owned by few shareholders find it challenges in creating ownership 
and restructuring that ownership to meet the requirements.  
f) Soliciting for suitable shareholders. Social investors are rare to find and commercial 
investors would insist to see the business viability. Investors have variety of interests 
in business and getting investors that share same mission may be hard. 
g) Resource base and size of the institution. The larger MFIs have been able ability to 
raise their own resource to fund part of the transformation processes. They stand 
better position to fund raise from both commercial and donor sources since they can 
produce attractive financial statements.  
h) Motivational level for transformation. Becoming a regulated institution was identified 
as a motivator and institutions viewing regulation as improving public image, stability 
and discipline were positive about business prospects in transformation tended to put 
extra effort to attain the license. 
i) Institutional readiness to transform. Preparatory work such as training board 
members, management and staff is helpful in creating awareness and buy-in. Those 
MFIs that made use of experts on various transformational tasks had an advantage. 
j) Management inertia. The regulator specifies the calibre of personnel that are 
supposed to run the regulated DTMs. Pushing for transformation is seen as CEOs and 
top management team calling for their retrenchment hence conflict of interest. 
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k) Application process and documentation required. The process of getting a license to 
operate microfinance deposit-taking business is lengthy, cumbersome a lot of vetting 
at various stages, many documents and reports required, and strict deadlines for 
submission of such.  
l) Governance issues. Issues include determining board selection criteria, lack of 
motivation for boards to push for transformation, profiling directors and setting up 
board systems. 
m) ‘Wait – and – see’ attitude. After applying for name approval, many MFI’s seem to 
have adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude to learn from the experience of those that have 
been regulated.  
5.2 Conclusion  
The literature and empirical evidence in this research point out the importance of regulation 
microfinance operations. The role of regulation in bringing sanity and stability in the 
financial sector cannot be underscored. As MFIs grow both in outreach and asset base, public 
interest on security of their resources also increases. Financial scandals in the name of 
microfinance has twice happened in Kenya could cause panic and loss of public confidence in 
the entire financial sector. Regulation is therefore necessary. 
The empirical evidence confirms that MFIs targeted for prudential regulation have to undergo 
a process of transformation. Other institutions targeted by non-prudential regulation will 
largely make minor adjustments to their operations to comply with the low. The 
transformation process is not a bed of roses. Many of them, as supported by the analysis in 
the preceding chapters, were dogged with huge challenges that slowed their process of 
transformation. The factors that influenced the process of transformation varied from 
institution to institution.  
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The regulatory framework for microfinance should provide room for various players in the 
sector and thus the tiered approach to regulation is appropriate. There should be adequate 
motivation for institutions to operate at most convenient environment for them. A 
considerable effort should be made by the regulator to understand the sector it is trying to 
regulate. This could be improved by setting up a working committee comprising of members 
from the regulator, practitioners and consultants among others during initial stages in 
developing regulatory framework. This framework has worked well in Pakistan (Ahmed & 
Shah, 2007). The regulatory process should be based on shared experience. 
This research identifies certain areas that could be of interest for further research. One of such 
areas would to find out the impact of such regulation and whether the benefits justify the 
effort. There is need to research on the emerging issues of mission drift caused by regulation 
and whether this is beneficial to the society. The tendency of regulated institutions to move 
up market is a threat to exclusion of the poor and works against the spirit of deepening 
financial inclusion. This creates a research opportunity.  
5.3 Limitations 
Information about all MFI operation in Kenya was not readily available limiting sampling 
techniques to apply. Data from Central Bank of Kenya on institutions that sought name 
approval and their contacts was not available. This led to use of less powerful sampling 
technique for statistical purposes. However that data collected included key players in the 
sector and those that are targeted by the regulation. 
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